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The Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court
WIENCZYSLAW J. WAGNER*
1. The Original Jurirdiction oJ the Supreme Court: Ex-
cluxive and Concurrent
The scope of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court' is delimited by the Constitution itself.2 Art. III,
Sec. 2 (2) provides that:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the
Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
It is interesting to note the close connection of these
provisions with international law; the first class of cases
submitted to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
involves the relations of the union with foreign countries;
the second is not less vital for the nation: it concerns con-
*The author, a teaching fellow, Northwestern University School of Law re-
ceived an LL.M. from the University of Warsaw, an LL.M. from Northwestern
University, and an LL.D. from the University of Paris. lie formerly taught at
the Fordham University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
1. During the debates preceding the establishment of the union, suggestions
were advanced that the Supreme Court have only appellate jurisdiction. The
Elan submitted by Virginia proposed "[that the jurisdiction of the inferior tri-
unals shall be to hear and determine in the first instance, and of the supreme
tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort ...." On the contrary, the
New Jersey llan conferred upon the federal judiciary "to consist of a supreme
tribunal," original jursidiction "on all impeachments of federal officers," but
appellate jurisdiction "in all cases touching the rights of ambassadors." A. T.
PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1941), 60-54.
2. The Constitution devotes very little space to the federal judiciary. "Art.
III of the Constitution .. .contains less than 400 words as compared with 3,000
in the preceding articles covering the legislative and the executive." H. Tweed,
Provixione of the Constitution Concerninj the Supreme Court of the United States,
31 B.U.L. REV. 1, 6, (1951).
3. Most discussions about the Supreme Court in the Constitutional Conven-
tion and in the ratifying conventions concerned just its original jurisdiction.
H. Tweed, Supra note 2, at 6.
112 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
troversies in which the member states are parties; as they
still retain their sovereignty or quasi-sovereignty, the
Supreme Court assumes the role of a quasi-international
tribunal and applies, in some instances, the principles of
international law.
The provisions of Art. IlI, Sec. 2 (2) are clear in that
they do not leave any power to Congress to limit the
Court's original jurisdiction.' On the contrary, the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Court is subject to the regulations
of Congress, by virtue of the next provisions of Art. III,
Sec. 2 (2):
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
It has been held, in early years of the union, that Con-
gress not only has no power to limit the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, but it also cannot extend this
jurisdiction.' Marbuly v. A31adiron,6 which established
the doctrine of judicial review of the acts of the legislature,
is also an authority for the construction of the original
jurisdiction clause of the Constitution. Chief Justice
Marshall, speaking for the Court, stressed the fact that the
Constitution enumerates the powers of the Supreme Court,
"and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the
4. "It is declared that 'in all cases affecting ambassadors, &c., the supreme
court ,rhall ha'e original jurisdiction.' Could congress withhold original jurisdiction
in these cases from the supreme court? . . . the framers of the constitution used
the words in an imperative sense." justice Story, delivered the opinion in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 332, (1816).
5. However, "[iln the early days of the Government, the right of Congress
to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, in cases not enumerated in
the Constitution, was maintained by many jurists, and seems to have been en-
tertained by the learned judges who decided Todd's case. But discussion and
more mature examination has settled the question otherwise; and it has long
been the established doctrine, and we believe now assented to by all who have
examined the subject, that the original jurisdiction of this court is confined to
the cases specified in the Constitution, and that Congress cannot change it. In
all other cases its power must be appellate." Note by Chief Justice Taney, inserted
by order of the Court, following the opinion in the case of United States v. F. P.
Ferreira, 13 How. (154 U.S.) 40, 53, (1851). The United States v. Yale Todd
case, referred to by the Court, was decided by the Supreme Court in 1794 but
not printed, as there was no official reporter at that time.
6. 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1801).
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jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases
in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in
others it shall take appellate jurisdiction." He drew the
inference "that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is
original and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and
not original," and held the provision of Sec. 13 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,' which empowered the Supreme Court
to issue writs of mandamus to "persons holding office
under the authority of the United States," unconstitutional.
The interpretation of the Constitution, expressed in
the rule of Marbury v. Madis'on, that original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court cannot be either extended or limited,
has been reaffirmed more than once, and is one of ihe funda-
mental restraints on Congress in its powers in respect to
the regulation of the distribution of competence between
the federal courts. Irrespective of the acts of Congress, the
Supreme Court will not assume original jurisdiction of
cases not enumerated in the Constitution.
However, it does not follow that the whole original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must be exclusive;,
among the cases which, by virtue of the Constitution, may
be brought before the Supreme Court as the court of first
instance, two classes may be distinguished: one, comprizing
cases the circumstances of which require them to be within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the highest federal tribunal,
and the other, which may be submitted to a lower federal
court as well.
The distinction is based upon the principle that the
dignity of some parties to a suit does not allow the United
States to compel them to be sued before any lower court.
These parties are: states, members of the union,9 which
7. An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 STAT. 73
(1789).
8. And this in spite of the fact that Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the
opinion in Marbury v. Madison, "used language ... which might, perhaps, imply
that such original jurisdiction as had been granted by the Constitution was ex-
clusive." Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S.449, 467, (1884). As under-
stood by Circuit Justice Taney, the Court said "in general terms," in Marbury v.
Madison, "that the original jurisdiction conferred on the supreme court was ex-
clusive." Gittings v. Crawford, 10 Fed.Cas.447, 448, No. 5,465 (C.C.D.Md.1838).
9. Of course, in accordance with international law, a foreign state cannot be
sued, even before the Supreme Court, without its consent.
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retain-at least in theory-their "quasi-sovereignty;" and
official representatives of foreign sovereign states. ° There-
fore, cases in which they are defendants must be within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; whereas,
in cases in which they are plaintiffs the choice of the court
may be left to them."
The distinction between the two categories of cases within
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was drawn
in the earliest days of the nation. From the very be-
ginning of the American federal system the legislature
interpreted the Constitution as giving it the power to
submit some types of cases within the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to the concurrent jurisdiction of
lower federal courts. Congress exercised this power in
the first Judiciary Act of 1789. Sec. 13 of the Act provided:
That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except
between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state
and citizens of other states or aliens, in which latter case it shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. And shall have
exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against
ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or
domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise con-
sistentlv with the law of nations, and original, but not exclusive,
jirisdiction of all stits brought by ambassadors, or other public
ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party.
Sec. 9 granted to the district courts "jurisdiction ex-
clusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits
against consuls or vice-consuls."
The provisions of the Judiciary Act were checked early
by the courts. The first reported case is that of United
Slale" v. Raara," involving "a consul from Genoa." The
10. About their (omelstics, see infi-a pp. 129-130.
11. "[T]o compel a state to resort to this one tribunal for the redress of all its
grievances, or to deprive an ambassador, public minister, or consul of the privi-
lege of suing in any court he chose having jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter of his action would be, in many cases, to convert what was in-
tended as a favor into a burden." Ames v. Kansas ex ret. Johnston, 111 U.S.449,
464. (1884).
12. 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 297 (C.C.D.Pa. 1793).
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case was a criminal one in which the consul was indicted
"for a misdemeanor, in sending anonymous and threaten-
ing letters to Mr. Hammond, the British Minister, Mr.
Holland, a citizen of Philadelphia, and several other per-
sons, with a view to extort money." The United States
Circuit Court for the Pennsylvania District took cogniz-
ance of the case.
The defendant's counsel argued that "on account of
the defendant's official character," the "exclusive cogni-
zance of the case" belonged to the United States Supreme
Court, and invoked the provisions of Art. 1II, Sec. 2 of
the Constitution. His contentions persuaded Justice
Iredell, to whom it appeared that "for obvious reasons of
public policy, the Constitution intended to vest an ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, upon all ques-
tions relating to the Public Agents of Foreign Nations."
Besides, the context of the judiciary article of the Consti-
tution seemed to him fairly to justify the interpretation,
that the word original meant exclusive jurisdiction.
However, the two remaining Justices thought otherwise.
Justice Wilson delivered an extremely short (nine lines)
opinion, asserting that:
although the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court an origi-
iial jurisdiction, in cases like the present, it does not preclude
the Legislature from exercising its power of vesting a concurrent
jurisdiction, in such inferior Courts, as might by law be es-
tablished: And as the Legislature has expressly declared, that
the Circuit Court shall have "exclusive cognizance of all crimes
and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United
States," I think the indictment ought to be sustained.
Justice Peters concurred in Justice Wilson's opinion,
and the motion for quashing the indictment was rejected. 3
In a later case, Gitting~r v. Crawjord,14 Circuit Justice
Taney's opinion, delivered for the court, cited some pre-
vious cases (reported and unreported) and admitted that
13. The trial was postponed until the next term; the consul was tried in 1794
and found guilty; "but he was afterwards pardoned, on condition . . . that he
surrendered his commission and Exequatur. ' Ibid., 299.
14. 10 Fed.Cas.447, No. 5,465 (C.C.D.Ald. 1838).
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after Jlarbury v. Mladison the courts hesitated and in a
few dicta expressed the opinion that "the clause granting
original jurisdiction to the supreme court was so far ex-
clusive, that congress could not grant original jurisdiction,
in the cases enumerated, to an inferior tribunal of the
United States," but held that "[the original jurisdiction
conferred on the supreme court [was] not inconsistent with
the exercise of original jurisdiction on the same subjects
by the inferior courts of the United States, and there
[was] no necessity, therefore, for implying an intention to
exclude them.""
This reasoning has beer repeated in other cases. In
Almes v. Kansas ex rel. Johnsfton16 the Supreme Court
stressed the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed
by the first Congress, "in which were many who had been
leading and influential members of the convention, and
who were familiar with the discussions that preceded the
adoption of the Constitution by the States, and with the
objections urged against it." This Congress "did not
understand that the original jurisdiction vested in the
Supreme Court was necessarily exclusive." The Court
did not find it possible to reject the construction of the
Constitution given by a body which included many of its
drafters. 7
The rules settled by the first Judiciary Act have remained
in force ever since. The Judicial Code of 1911 repeated the
provisions of previous Judiciary Acts practically without
change.
Thus, it is now "well settled"'" that by congressional
legislation, cases within original jurisdiction of the Sup-
reme Court may be brought before other federal courts;
and it can be added, that they may reach the Supreme
Court as an appellate instance, in spite of the sweeping
15. Gittings v. Crawford, 10 Fed.Cas. 447, 450, No. 5,465 (C.C.D.Md. 1838).
16. Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 464, (1884).
17. The persuasiveness of the arguments of the Court is diminished by the
the fact that another provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was held unconstitu-
tional in Marbury v. Madison in spite of the prestige of the first Congress which
enacted it.
18. United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F.Supp. 167, 176 (1939).
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rule of if1arbiuni v. MIadison,' that if in some cases the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is original, it cannot be
appellate.
By virtue of See. 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
the provisions of later judicial codes, controversies of a
civil nature where a state was a party were subjected to
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court (with the exception of cases where individuals were
the other party). This principle was invoked by California
in United States v. California,0 where a federal district
court took jurisdiction of a controversy brought before it
by the United States under Sec. 6 of the Safety Appliance
Act, as amended in 1896. The Court held that the United
States was entitled to recover a penalty for violation of
the Act.
It seems that the case could not be classified as being
of a "civil nature"; but the Supreme Court did not decide
this question. It held that since the Act, a legislative en-
actment posterior to the Judicial Code of 1911, expressly
provided for concurrent jurisdiction, it superseded the
provisions of the Code. Similarly, in Case v. Bowles"1 it
was held that Sec. 205 (c) of the Emergency Price Control
Act, specifically conferring upon the district courts juris-
diction of all enforcement suits, superseded the provi-
sions of Sec. 233 of the Judicial Code, giving the Sup-
reme Court "exclusive jurisdiction to try cases between a
State and the United States."
The Judicial Code of 1948 limited the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court to controversies "between two
or more States," and submitted suits between the United
States and the states to the concurrent jurisdiction. Thus,
no special statutory provisions are any longer required to
authorize the bringing of such a suit before a federal district
court instead of before the Supreme Court.
19. "The general expressions in the case of Marbury v. Madison must be
understood with the limitations which are given to them in this opinion." Cohens
v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264, 401, (1821).
20. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
21. 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
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The full text of the provisions of the Judicial Code now
in force, relating to the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, reads as follows:22
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of
(1) All controversies between two or more States;
(2) All actions or proceedings against ambassadors or other
public ministers of foreign states or their domestics or
domestic servants, not ;nconsistent with the law of
nations
The next paragraph of the same section subjects other
cases within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts:
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of
(1) All actions or proceedings brought by ambassadofs or
other public ministers of foreign states or to which
consuls or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a
State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the
citizens of another State or against aliens.
Before the examining of specific cases of which the
Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction be-
cause of the quality of the parties, it should be pointed
out that the Court will decline to pass on a case if the
character of the controversy is not justiciable but political.
This is a general principle limiting the jurisdiction of the
courts, and its application to cases where the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked has been
stressed on various occasions by the Court. Questions
22. 28 U.S.C.A. judicary and Judicial Procedure), Part IV, Chapter 81,
Section 1251.
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which are not justiciable will not be passed upon by the
Court.2"
On the other hand the Court will assume its original
jurisdiction even in absence of any Congressional legisla-
tion regulating the process and mode of proceeding. The
Constitution conferred a duty upon the Court, and the
lack of any legislation on the subject cannot deprive it
of its jurisdiction."z Once the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is established, it will exercise it irrespective of the
amount in controversy, since the Constitution did not
impose upon it any such limitation."5
2. Actionx againxt Ambaradors, other Public Minixerx,
their Domexticx and Domextic Servanti
The first class of cases which by virtue of the Constitu-
tion are within the original jursidiction of the Supreme
Court are those affecting 26 ambassadors, other public
23. The jurisdiction of the controversies between states "is of so delicate and
grave a character that it was not contemplated that it would be exercised save
when the necessity was absolute and the matter in itself properly justiciable."
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15, (1900). "Jurisdiction over controversies of
that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions." Ibid., 23.
The Constitution made some things "justiciable which were not known as such
at the common law; such, for example, as controversies between States as to
boundary lines, and other questions admitting of judicial solution . . . The estab-
lishment of this new branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the
extinguishment of diplomatic relations between the States. Of other contro-
versies between a State and another State or its citizens, which on the settled prin-
ciples of public law are not subjects of judicial cognizance, this court has often
declined to take jurisdiction." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.1, 15, (1890).
24. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. (58"U.S.) 478, 491, (1855). The Court said
that it was itself "authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding,
so as to accomplish the ends for which the jurisdiction was given."
25. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300, (1888). The Court added
that "Congress has never imposed (if indeed it could impose) any such limitation";
and it seems that Congress could not thus limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
26. A case brought against a person guilty of violating the diplomatic immunity
of a foreign representative does not "affect' this representative, in the constitu-
tional meaning, and is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. (24 U.S.) 468 (1826), it was unsuccessfully
contended that the case involving an assault on a public minister was covered by
the constitutional clause. As early as in 1790, persons guilty of "offering violence"
to an ambassador or other public minister were subjected to imprisonment not
exceeding three years and fined (An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes
against the United States, 1 Stat. 112, 118, Sec. 28). By virtue of the Federal Crimi-
nal Code now in force, the crime of "assualting public minister" is punishable by a
fine not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than three years, or both.
. In Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F.Supp. 400 (1940), aff'd 115 F.2d 375 (certiorari
and rehearing denied), it was held that a suit against an American citizen in a
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ministers and consuls. The Constitution recognized that
the prestige of the sovereign nations which they represent
requires the submission of such cases to the original juris-
diction of the highest tribunal of the United States."7 In
respect to actions against ambassadors, public ministers,
their domestics and domestic servants, the Judicial Code
made this jurisdiction exclusive.
In the courts of the United States the term "public
minister" has been understood as covering all persons en-
titled to diplomatic privileges and immunities. "8 There-
fore, the meaning of the term may be found by examining
the group of persons to whom the immunities are accorded.2 '
The special position of foreign diplomats, their privi-
leges and immunities, is one of the basic principles of the
law of nations recognized for centuries .3  The Judicial
Code expressly limited the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
to cases consistent with international law.
Immediately after the Constitution came into effect and
the first Judiciary Act was passed, Congress resolved to
protect the diplomatic privileges of foreign representatives
case in which he was indicted for conspiracy with two ex-attachs to the Japanese
Embass under the Espionage Act did not "affect" public ministers, and was
cogniza ble by a federal district court.
27. A rationalization of the constitutional provision has been given by Hazul-
ton: "Public ministers of every class are the immediate representatives of th"r
sovereigns. All questions in which they are concerned are so directly connected
with the public peace, that as well for the preservation of this, as out of respect
to the sovereignties they represent, it is both expedient and proper that such
questions should be submitted in the first instance to the highest judiciary of the
nation. Though consuls have not in strictness a diplomatic character, yet asthe
are the public agents of the nations to which they belong, the same ob=e-vatici
are in a great measure applicable to them." THE FEDERALIST, No. 81 at 416
(edited by Max Beloff 1948).
28. United States v. Coplon, 84 Fed.Supp. 472, 477 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1949)-
29. The term "public minister" will be used interchangeably with "diplomat"
and "foreign representative."
30. The old principle of immunity of diplomatic representatives from the
jurisdiction of the country in which they reside was expounded by Hugo Grotius
in DE fURE BELLI AC PACIS: "As to what respects the elects[mobilial of an ambassador, which are considered as belogig to0:ris th
are not liable to seizure, neither for the payment nor for the security of a debt...
for an ambassador, in order to enjoy complete security, ought to be exempt from
every species of restraint, both as to his person, andto those things which are
necessary for his use. If, then, he has contracted debts, and if, which is usually
the case, he has no real property [immobilia] in the country, he should he politey
requested to pay, and, if he refuses, resort must be had to his sovereHn- .
TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1905), 47.
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in respect to their immunity from judicial process by
some provisions of the Act for the Punishment of certain
Crimes against the United States," of April 30, 1790.32
Sec. 25 of the Act is embodied today in Sec. 252, Title 22
U.S.C.A. (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), practically
without any change. Sec. 252 declares void "any writ
or process ...whereby the person of any ambassador or
public minister of any foreign prince or State, authorized
and received as such by the President, or any domestic or
domestic servant of any such minister, is arrested or im-
prisoned, and his goods or chattels are distrained, seized,
or attached."
Of course, the above provision is but declaratory of
the principle of international law, which is deemed to be
"a part of the law of the land." But, by its express incorpo-
ration in the domestic legal system, the courts and other
authorities of the union are made directly bound by it."
Only in one case does the positive law of the United
States permit the bringing of an action against a person
"in the service of an ambassador or a public minister,"
and lift the prohibition of Sec. 252, Title 22 U.S.C.A.
This case was provided for as early as in 1790, by the above
mentioned Act,34 and now, slightly changed, is found in
Sec. 252, Title 22 U.S.C.A. It refers to suits where de-
fendant "is a citizen or inhabitant of the United States ...
and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before
he entered upon such service." If such a case arises, it
seems that the suit can be brought only in the Supreme
Court, by virtue of Sec. 1251, Title 28 U.S.C.A.
The permission to sue is probably intended to prevent
the debtors from escaping their liability by entering into
the service of a foreign representative. However, it has
31. The provisions of the Act referring to foreign relations of the United
States were based on the Statute 7 Anne, c.12, the wording of which the Act
repeated in several instances.
32. 1 STAT. 112, 117, Sec. 25, (1790).
33. Sec. 253, Title 22 U.S.C.A., declares a person guilty of violating Sec.252
"a violator of the laws of nations and a disturber of the public repose," and pro-
vides for him a penalty of imprisonment for not more than three years and fine
at the discretion of the court. Sec.253 is a repetition of Sec. 26 of the Act of 1790.
34. 1 STAT. 112, 118, Sec. 27, (1790).
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never been applied. It was invoked in Carrera v. Carrera,15
not before the Supreme Court, in an action by the wife of
defendant for separate maintenance for herself and for
the custody of and support for their fifteen year old son.
Defendant, although not an American citizen, resided
permanently in the United States and entered into the
service of the Czechoslovakian Ambassador. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dis-
missed the suit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that it cannot regard defendant's "moral or legal obliga-
tion to support his child ...as a 'debt contracted before
he entered upon' the Ambassador's service. '
The Supreme Court will entertain a suit against a foreign
diplomat only if the action is "not inconsistent with the law
of nations." Thus, international law must be consulted
in each case where a suit is brought.
The only clear case where the suing of a foreign repre-
sentative is permitted by international law, is when his
diplomatic immunities are waived. By waiver defendant
becomes submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States
courts. The waiver may concern the protection given
defendant by the law of nations, but it cannot relate to
the jurisdiction of the courts. Their jurisdiction is manda-
tory and cannot be changed by the parties. Even if the
immunity is waived, the diplomat remains a "public
minister." Thus, a suit against him is cognizable only by
the Supreme Court.
The waiver of the broad immunities of a public minister,
or of the much more limited privileges of a consul, cannot
be effected by defendant himself, either by his general
appearance, or his pleading to the merits,3" or any other
means. The privilege is not his; it is accorded to the sov-
ereign whom he represents." Therefore, only the sending
35. 174 F.2d 496, 84 U.S.App.D.C.333 (1949).
36. Ibid., 498.
37. Friedberg v. Santa Cruz, 86 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371, 274 App.Div. 1072 (1949).
appeal denied 87 N.Y.S.2d 427, 275 App.Div. 710 (1949).
38. See charge to jury by Justice Baldwin in United States v. Benner, 24
Fed.Cas. f084, 1087, No. 14, 568 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1830). In Davis v. Packard;
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state may renounce the privilege of its representative by
its government or the chief of the mission."
In practice, cases of waiver happen very rarely. There-
fore, the application of Sec. 12 51 (a)(1) of the Judicial
Code is extremely restricted, and the cases which arise in
the courts in the United States, involve the question of
whether defendant is a foreign diplomat, entitled to full
immunities and not subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts at all, rather than of whether because of his character
defendant could be sued only in the Supreme Court. The
decisions reached, however, also have a direct bearing on
the question of who may be sued in the Supreme Court in
the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, if
the circumstances of the case permit such -an action. The
possibility of invoking this jurisdiction in a suit against a
foreign representative is always imminent.
What class of persons should be considered as "ambas-
sadors or other public ministers of foreign states or their
domestics or domestic servants," entitled to a special
treatment?
The term "ambassador" is clear; but an interpretation
of the expression "public minister" must be made. Of
course, the ministers plenipotentiary of foreign states,
accredited to the government of the United States, are
covered by this term; but it must be understood in a
much broader sense, and cover other persons possessing
the character of diplomatic representatives and their
staffs."0 Thus, it has been held that it includes the charges
d'affaires," even if they are consuls, appointed to per-
7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 276, 284 (1833), the Court said: "If the privilege or exemption
lof a foreign consull was merely personal, it can hardly be supposed that it would
have been thought a matter sufficiently important to require a special provision
in the Constitution and laws of the United States."
39. See the HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, DRAFT CONVEN-
TION (1932). Article 26.
40. "Ambassadors and other public ministers" mean "all possible diplomatic
agents which any foreign power may accredit to the United States." Op.Atty.
Gen.209 (1855).
41. United States v. Lafontaine, 26 Fed.Cas. 832, No. 15,550 (C.C.Dist.Col.
1831).
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form the duties of a charge d'affaires only until a minister
plenipotentiary should arrive in the United States; 2 the
secretaries of a legation;"' the attaches to a legation, 1 or
the press counselors." The Instructions to Diplomatic
Officers oj the United States, issued in 1927, declares that
"[tlhe personal immunity of a diplomatic representative
extends to his household, and especially to his diplomatic
''46staff. Generally, his servants share therein ....
A proper interpretation of the term public minister
has been given by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in United States v.
Coplon, ' in which it was said that it "generally denotes
an emissary of one sovereign to another sovereign sent to
perform diplomatic duties. It encompasses persons of all
ranks . . . The American cases have tended to classify as
public ministers all persons entitled under international
law to diplomatic immunity, regardless of rank.""8
In recent years, another group of persons residing within
the United States must be recognized as "public ministers":
the representatives of various nations in the United Na-
tions and some members of their staffs. 9 Thus, it has been
held in City oj New Rochelle on complaint oj Burkhardt v.
42. Dupont v. Pichon, 4 DalI. (4 U.S.) 321 (Pa. 1805).
43. Ex parte Cabrera, 4 Fed.Cas. 964, No. 2,278 (C.C.D:Pa. 1805).
44. United States v. Benner, 24 Fed.Cas. 1084, No. 14,568 (C.C.Pa. 1830);
In Re Anfrye, 3 Wkly. Notes Cas.188 (Pa. 1876).
45. Mongillo v. Vogel, 84 F.Supp. 1007 (D.C.Pa. 1949).
46. Ch.VII, Sec. 8; see 4 MOORE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST,
433 ss, 648 ss.
47. 84 Fed.Supp. 472, 477 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1949).
48. In accordance with the HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, the privileges and immunities should be understood as relating, in general
terms, "to a member of a mission, to a member of his fa-mily, and to a member
of the administrative personnel." DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IM-
MUNITIES, DRAFT CONVENTION (1932), Article 16.
49. By virtue of the Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States, 61 Stat. 756 (1946), full diplomatic status is accorded
to principal resident representatives to the United Nations of Member-States,
and such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon between the
U.N., the United States, and the Member-State concened. Art. 105 of the U.N.
Charter makes no distinction between the representatives of the Member-States
and the officials of the Organization, and requires for them only "such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions
in connection with the Organization."
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Page-Sharp0 that the secretary of the Australian mission
to the United Nations was entitled to diplomatic privileges
and immunities. Similarly, in Friedberg v. Santa CruzY
the New York court held that it had no jurisdiction in an
action to "recover damages for personal injuries ... alleged
to have been due to the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle owned by defendant .. .and operated by his wife,"
because defendant was a Permanent Representative to
the United Nations from the Republic of Chile, and rec-
ognized by the Department of State as entitled to diplo-
matic privileges and immunities. The court invoked
Sec. 15 of Public Law 357 of the 80th Congress, Chapter
482.52 By virtue of this permanent repre-entatives to
the United Nations were to be treated in the same mar-
ner as diplomatic envoys accredited to the United States.
The court recognized Santa Cruz' defense based on the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
clause of the Judicial Code as "clearly sufficient in law"
to dismiss the case.
The representatives of different states in the United
Nations should be distinguished from the employees of
the Organization. In United States v. Coplon" an employee
of the United Nations was held not to be included in the
constitutional provisions relating to "public ministers,"
in spite of the fact that prior to his arrival in the United
States, he was a Third Secretary, employed by the Rus-
sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that upon his arrival
in the United States he carried a Soviet diplomatic pass-
port bearing a United States diplomatic visa. Thus, the
Supreme Court did not have original and exclusive juris-
diction in criminal proceedings against him, and the United
States District Court could try the defendant for the
offenses charged.54
50. 196 Misc.8, 91 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1949).
51., 86 N.Y..S.2d 369 (1949).
52. In other words, the Headquarters Agreement; see note 49.
53. 84 F.Supp. 472 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1949).
54. "Executive Order No. 9698, 22 U.S.C.A., Sec. 288 note, 11 Fed. Reg.
1809 has made the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C.A.
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In some other cases defendants were not recognized as
"public ministers" even though they asserted that they
were diplomatic representatives of foreign countries ac-
credited to the United States. In Hollander v. Baiz"' it
was held that a United States citizen who was consul
general of Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras and was
in charge of the legation of these countries during the
absence of the minister was not a "public minister" as
understood by the laws of the United States. He did not
prove that he was a charge d'affaires ad interim, that he
was invested with "the principal diplomatic functions," or
that the Department of State recognized him as a diplo-
matic representative.
In Tro~d v. Tompkinx,"8 the Assistant Commissioner
for Shipping and Immigration of the Royal Yugoslav
Government was not recognized as public minister. It
was not proved that the Department of State considered
defendant as included in the group of persons to whom
the diplomatic immunity extended. Defendant was pro-
vided an office in the embassy building, and his work was
supervised by the ambassador. But, in this respect, said
the court, "the latter's action [was] but an instance, not
unusual, of the exercise of a non-diplomatic function by a
diplomatic representative," since defendant's duties con-
sisted of transacting business with private persons or
organizations not connected with the United States govern-
ment. The work in which defendant was engaged was
"a matter extrinsic to the diplomatic functions" and did
not entitle him to diplomatic immunity owed to "mem-
bers of the official or domestic household of the ambassa-
dor," such as "secretaries, military attachs, clerks, or
domestic servants."
Sec. 288, applicable to the United Nations. But that Act . ..does not confer
general diplomatic status ... It does confer immunity on U.N. officers and em-
plo-ees for the category of acts performed by them in their official capacity and
faling within their functions . . . Ibid 474. Thus, their position is similar to that
of consuls. The Court stressed the fact, that in accordance with the U.N. Charter
and the Resolution of the U.N. Assembly of 1946, immunities of subordinate
officials of the Organization are only very limited.
55. 41 Fed.732 (D.C.N.Y. 1890).
56. 44 A.2d 226 (D.C.Mun.App. 1945).
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A condition of treating a diplomat or a member of his
staff as "public minister," in the meaning of the laws of
the United States, is that the United States recognize
his government and him as its representative. In United
Statexr v. Skinner" the privileges of a foreign minister were
claimed by defendant who "was a minister from the govern-
ment of Buenos Ayres to that of the United States," but
denied by the court on the ground that he was not ac-
credited by the president, and the independence of Buenos
Ayres was not acknowledged by the goverment of the
United States. Similarly, the attorney general pointed
out that no diplomatic privileges could be granted to Mr.
French, who came to the United States to-present himself
as minister of Nicaragua, where no diplomatic intercourse
with the revolutionary government of Nicaragua was
established. Mr. French was informed by the Department
of State that the United States would not treat him as a
minister."
As a general proposition, it may be said that the courts
will follow the certificates of the Department of State,
relating to the recognition or non-recognition of a state,
a government, or the official character of the defendant."'
The question has not only legal but also political aspects.
The certificates of the Department of State may be in
various forms. In one case 0 an affidavit of defendant was
read "setting forth that he [was] Military Attach6 of the
French Legation at Washington; also a telegram addressed
to John K. Valentine, United States District Attorney,
57. 27 Fed. Cas. 1123, No. 16,309 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1818).
58. 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 471 (1855).
59. "The constitution of the United States having vested in the president
the power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, has . . . bestowed
upon that branch of the government, not only the right, but the exclusive right,
to judge of the credentials of the ministers so received; and so long as they con-
tinue to be recognized and treated by the president as ministers, the other branches
of the government are bound to consider them as such. If courts . . . could sit
in judgment upon the decisions of the executive in reference to the public character
of a foreign minister . . . and deprive him of the privileges of a minister, what
an extraordinary anomaly would such an interference present to the world!"
United States v. Ortega, 27 Fed. Cas. 359, 361, No. 15,971, 4 Wash.C.C.531
(C.C.E.D.Pa 1825).
60. In re Anfrye, 3 Wkly. Notes Cas. 188 (Pa. 1876).
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dated Washington, December 8th, 1876, signed by Hamilton
Fish, Secretary of State, recognizing and affirming the said
official position of Captain Anfrye." In United Stales v.
Benner6' the court in charging the jury declared that a
certificate from the Secretary of State, under the seal of
the Department, to show that Mr. Bardis arrived in the
United States as attache to the legation of Denmark,
was full evidence of his character as public minister. In
In re Baiz62 the Supreme Court declined "to sit in judg-
ment upon the decision of the executive in reference to the
public character of a person claiming to be a foreign mini-
ster." As soon as the Department of State recognizes
defendant's claim of immunity "its determination of that
question is conclusive" upon the court.6" But additional
parol evidence as to the period during which a person was
recognized as a minister by the Government of the United
States may be admitted.64
On the other hand, the court will not recognize that
defendant is a public minister if the Department of State
denies him such a character. In United States v. Coplon"5
defendant Gubitchev claimed diplomatic immunity; but
the Department of State declared that he did not enjoy
diplomatic status, and the court held that "[it [was] a
political decision which the courts do not review." 8  In
spite of this holding, the court itself examined the decision
reached by the Department of State and concurred in it.
In Tro't v. Tompkins6 the court did not recognize as
equivalent to a certificate of the Department of State the
fact that defendant's name was printed on the "white list""6
of the Department, and held that the list was not a con-
61. 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, Case No. 14,568 (C.C.Pa. 1830).
62. 135 U.S. 403 (1889)..
63. Friedberg v. Santa Cruz, 86 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371, 274 Misc.1072 (1949).
64. United States v. Liddle, 26 Fed.Cas.936, No. 15,598, 2 Wash.C.C.205
(C.C.Pa. 1808).
65. 84 Fed.Supp. 472 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1949).
66. Ibid., 475.
67. 44 A.2d 226 (D.C.Mun.App. 1945).
68. List of Employees in the Embassies and Legations in Washington Not
Printed in the Diplomatic List.
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clusive proof of the character of defendant, since it could
not be said that the executive's recognition of his charac-
ter was expressed by it. If, however, beyond the listing
of defendant's name in the "white book," there is presented
a letter of the Department of State, stating expressly that
the listing was made pursuant to the registration of de-
fendant in the Department of State as an employee of a
foreign ambassador, the court will not inquire into the
propriety of the listing, and will accept the evidence as
conclusive.69
The term public minister may be interpreted broadly,
in order to harmonize the United States laws with the re-
quirements of the law of nations. But, however extensive,
no construction of the term can cover the domestics and
domestic servants of ambassadors and public ministers.
Congress cannot extend the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to cases not provided for expressly by the
Constitution; thus, how could the Judiciary Acts confer
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
on "actions and proceedings against . . . domestics or do-
mestic servants"?
The only possible answer is to find the authorization
for the congressional enactments in the term affecting
ambassadors and other public ministers, for as a matter of
fact, diplomats may be affected not only by suits to which
they are parties. Suing of their "domestics or domestic
servants" may also be a matter of concern for them and a
hindrance in the performance of their official duties. This
interpretation of the constitutional provisions was prob-
ably the basis for the first Judiciary Act.
The term domestic is defined in Webster's International
Dictionary as "of or pertaining to the household or family."
In the sense used in the Judiciary Acts it should be under-
stood as covering members of the family of public ministers.
The Harvard Research in International Law speaks generally
about the "members of family," whereas the Havana
Convention on Diplomatic Officers (1928) restricts the im-
69. Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 333 (1949).
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munities to "members of the respective families living under
the same roof." The latter interpretation of the term
domestic was adopted in Friedberg v. Santa Cruz,7" which
followed the Havana Convention.1 The New York Court
emphasized the fact that "in present day usage the word
'domestics' is ordinarily understood as meaning household
servants," but that it must be viewed in the light of his-
torical considerations and of the fact that in using the
words domesticr and domesutic s'ervants Congress intended
to ascribe a different meaning to each term. Thus, the
wife of a public minister was recognized as a domestic of
her husband and as suable only in the Supreme Court in
the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction.
The domestic servants of foreign representatives will be
deemed as covered by the Judicial Code provisions irres-
pective of the function they perform: the cook of the
charge' d'affaires of Sweden and Norway,72 or the butler
and chauffeur of the Czechoslovakian Ambassador..' The
United States legal system places them practically on the
same footing with the diplomats, contrarily to the practice
of some other nations. The trend to curtail their im-
munities is reflected in Art. 23, Draft Convention, Diplomatic
Pr ivileges and In u nitie.7 1
There was a conflict of opinion as to what extent diplo-
matic privileges and immunities granted to ambassadors
and public ministers resident in the United States are to
be accorded to diplomats who sojourn in the United States
only temporarily or in transit. In Carbone v. Carbone b
the Supreme Court of New York County invoked the prin-
ciples of international law and held that defendant who
70. 86 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1949).
71. "In our opinion, the term 'domestic' ... includes a member of the am-
bassador's or minister's family, dwelling in his household." Ibid., 371.
72. United States v. Lafontaine, 26 Fed.Cas.832, No. 15,550, 4 Cranch,
C.C.173 (C.C.D.C. 1831).
73. Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 333 (1949).
74. Art. 23: "Subject to the provisions of this convention, a receiving state
may exercise jurisdiction over any member of the administrative or service per-
sonnel of a mission, only to an extent and in such manner as to avoid undue
interference with the conduct of the business of the mission."
75. 206 N.Y.S. 40, 123 Misc. 656 (1924).
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was a diplomatic attache of the Republic of Panama,
attached to its legation in Italy, was entitled only to
"certain" immunities. Accordingly, it vacated the order
to arrest defendant, but refused to vacate the service of
summons in plaintiff's action for divorce. The court did
not think that the suit could have been brought only in
the United States Supreme Court. 6
In other cases, however, an absolute immunity of diplo-
mats in transit was recognized by the courts. Thus, in
Witon v. Blanco7 the New York Superior Court vacated
a judgment against a minister plenipotentiary from Vene-
zuela to France, who was served process while waiting in
the City of New York, to take "early means of convey-
ance . . . to France." In the light of the wording of the
constitutional provisions, which do not qualify the ambas-
sadors and other public ministers to which they refer, if
not in the light of the principles of international law, this
decision seems to be well taken. By virtue of these pro-
visions, supplemented by those of the Judicial Code,
diplomats in transit should be sued only before the Sup-
reme Court in the exercise of its original and exclusive
jurisdiction in the rare cases permitted by international law.
The immunity of public ministers in transit from service
of civil process in the United States through which they
may pass on the way to their posts was upheld by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in the recent case of Bergman v. De Sieyer78
in which no service of process was allowed to the minister
of France to Bolivia. The court did not attempt to find
the solution of the problem in the construction of the
Constitution or statutes, but, admitting that there was
a conflict in the courts' decisions, founded its opinion pri-
marily on the law of nations which it examined extensively. 9
76. Federal courts refuse to take jurisdiction of cases involving divorce.
77. 56 N.Y. Super. Ct. (24 Jones & S.) 582, 4 N.Y.S. 714 (1889).
78. 71 F.Supp. 334 (1946).
79. The HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW limits
the immunities of the members of a mission in transit to persons who represent
a state recognized by the state of transit, which should be notified of the official
character of such a person (Art. 15 of the Draft Convention).
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It seems that this court's opinion indicates a trend which
will be followed.
Consuls are not included in the group of foreign repre-
sentatives who may be sued only in the Supreme Court.
This distinction is based upon the difference between the
character of a public minister and that of a consul, a dis-
tinction well settled in the law of nations."o International
law requires freedom of public ministers from being sued
in the country where they are accredited; but this re-
quirement does not refer to consuls." It is true that consuls
are often accorded a treatment different from that of any
other individual. But, apart from the acts strictly con-
nected with the performance of their official duties, this
attitude is the result .of either comity or of special con-
ventions between the states, not of a positive command of
international law. The rule that all cases to which consuls
are parties have to be brought in the federal courts has
its rationale in the fact that they are appointed to and
received by the union, not by the states, which abandoned
all their international law personality to the United States.
The distinction between public ministers and consuls per-
sists in the United States legal system as well as in others.13
And, indeed, it seems that in no country is there a law
by virtue of which a suit against a foreign consul may be
80. "[lit is now fully settled that a consul is not a public minister. He is not
considered as such by the writers of the law of nations, because he is not in any
degree invested with the representative character; and it has, more than once,
been judicially determined that he is not entitled to the privileges attached to
the person of every public minister." 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 42 (1794).
81. A consul "is not privileged from legal process ...by the general law of
nations." I Op. Atty. Gen. 77-78 (1797).
82. "[A] consul is not a public minister within the meaning of our act." 1 Op.
Atty. Gen. 409 (1820).
83. "[lt is universally recognized as a principle of international law that, in
the absence of express agreement therefor, immunity does not extend to consuls,
who are merely commercial representatives of foreign states." Carrera v. Carrera,
174 Fed.2d 496, 498 (C.A.D.C. 1948). In an early case, it was said: "Nor is there
anything in the official character and functions of a consul which should lead us
to suppose that the framers of the constitution meant to confine cases affecting
... [consuls] exclusively to the Supreme Court. A consul is not entitled, by the
law of nations, to the immunities and privileges of an ambassador or public
minister. He is liable to civil suits, like any other individual, in the tribunals of
the country in which he resides; and may be punished in its courts for any offence
he may commit against its laws. He, usually, is a person engaged in commerce.
Gittings v. Crawford, 10 Fed.Cas. 447, 450-451, No. 5,465 (C.C.N.Y. 1838).
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brought only in the Supreme Court. The commercial, and
not diplomatic character of the consul, is reflected in the
practice often followed by the states, of appointing as their
consuls businessmen or other persons, nationals and resi-
dents of the state in which they are to perform their func-
tions." This practice was so frequent that it was held in
Borr v. Predon" that where it does not appear from the
record that the consul is a foreign national he will be con-
sidered as a United States citizen. On the contrary, as a
general rule, a United States citizen will not be recognized
as a public minister of a foreign country."
In view of the purpose of the constitutional provisions
granting to ambassadors, other public ministers and con-
suls a special position before the United States courts, it is
dear that they did not refer to American diplomats and
consuls to foreign countries. A contrary construction based
upon the mere wording of the Constitution was rejected
by the courtsY
The foreign "public minister" should be treated as such
as soon as he enters the territory of the United States,"
even before he is received by the president if consent of
the United States to his appointment has been given in
advance.m Iis character should be recognized still after
the termination of his duties until he leaves the United
84. Gittm '. Crawfard. jma note 83 at 451: 'l1n this country, as well
as o l at oten happns that tor c!usular offe is omfered by a foreign govern-
-- ,t onam of om a-,e-s."
8.& III U.S. 252 (1884).
8M u the request to recmgnize the appointment of Mr. Baiz, a United
States tie, as charg daies of Honduras, the Secretary of State wrote:
"A difficulty anss in the fact . . that yu are a citizen of the United State. It
has been the almost uniform practice of this government to decline to recognize
American citizen as the areiie iloai rpeetatives of foreign powers.
The ... immunitics and ... pyilegs attaching to the office of a foreign minister
make it not only inconasstent at times even inconvenient, that a citizen of
t country bmild enjoy so anomalous a prities" In Re Baiz, 135 U.S.403,
411 (1890).
87. iMward v. McSaul. 17 Fed.Cas.42S. No. 9.624 (D.C-S-D.N.Y. (1846);
Er pwvi Grubmr 269 U.S. 30 (1925).
88. '10r,. if the person is already within the teritory of the receiigsae
as from the time of his hecomng ... a member [of a foneign mission] ad the
HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. DRAFT CONVEN-
TION. Artide 16.
89. H. TAYLOR. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUP-
REME COURT (1905) 47.
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States without unreasonable delay."0 The courts will have
to treat him as foreign public minister or consul so long
as the United States government does not withdraw its
recognition of his official position. Thus, United State" v.
T'rumbull"' held that a vice-consul of Chile, who possessed
an unrevoked exequalur granted him by the United States,
did not lose his official character in spite of the fact that
the government which appointed him was overthrown in
a revolution and a new government was established. Simi-
larly, the former charge d'affaires of Portugal, Barrazo
Pereira, was held entitled to his immunities even after Mr.
Torlade d'Azambuja was appointed and received by the
United States as his successor. A suit by the latter against
the former was dismissed.12 If, however, a public minister
resigns his position, returns his diplomatic identification
card and remains in the United States, he will enjoy the
immunity from suit only in respect to causes of action
which arose when he still performed his official duties.93
Of course, after a public minister's duties are terminated
and he returns to his country he is no longer entitled to
diplomatic immunity. 4
In the light of the foregoing observations, it is clear
that in spite of the fact that Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-
ania were annexed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics during World War II and do not exist any longer as
independent countries their diplomats, appointed before
the annexation, have to be recognized as immune from
being sued on any cause of action in any court except
the Supreme Court. The annexation of the Baltic countries
was not recognized by the United States, and their repre-
sentatives are still considered as "public ministers." 5
90. HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, DRAFT
CONVENTION. Article 29: "until such persons have had reasonable opportunity
to leave the territory of the recognizing state."
91. 48 Fed.94 (D.C.S.D.Cal. 1891).
92. Torlade d'Azanibuja -. Barrazo Pereira, I Miles 366 (Pa. 1830).
93. Mlangillo v. Vogel, 84 F.Supp. 1007 (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1949).
94. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375, 379 (1940).
95. Cf. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (C.C.A.3d 1944), where the Acting Estonian
Consul General in New York was recognized as such by the Court four years after
the annexation of Estonia by the U.SS.R.
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3. Con/ro' ewie.v bet .een the Stalex o the Union
After the establishment of a federal union had been
decided, it was necessary to provide for some peaceful
means of settling disputes between the members of the
federation.
Article IX of the Confederation provided for an arbitral
settlement of controversies between the states by a tri-
bunal ad hoc, composed of judges appointed by the parties
directly or with the help of Congress in case of lack of
agreement. A few disputes were settled in accordance with
Article IX?" A similar procedure was suggested at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, but rejected on the
motion of Rutledge who considered it necessary under the
Confederation, but superfluous in view of the fact that a
national judiciary would be established."
Thus, controversies between the states have been sub-
jected by the Constitution to the federal judiciary, and the
Judiciary Acts conferred upon the Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction of such cases. 8 The defendant states cannot
set up the defense that they acted as sovereigns.9 Indeed,
one of the bases upon which the union rests is the as-
sumption that the controversies between its members will
be settled by peaceful means. It would ill serve the inter-
state relations if a state were permitted to declare that it
does not consent to be sued by another state and thus
leave the plaintiff without possibility of judicial redress.
The anarchy still existing in international law had to be
eliminated from the internal structure of the union. As
96. For details, see H. TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1905) 8-9; CHAR-
LES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES (1924)
4ss.; JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTRO-
VERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1919) 2.
97. A. 1. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1941) 729-730.
98. Commenting upon the original jurisdiction clause of the Constitution
Hlamilton wrote: "In cases in which a state might hap en to be a party, it wuuld
ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an inferior tri.unal." THE FEDERAL-
IST, No. 81, 416 (edited by Max Beloff 1948).
99. "State is subject to the jursidiction of the federal courts, in cases pro-
vided for by the federal law, irrespective of whether it acts in its 'sovereign' or
in its 'private' capacity." United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183. (1956).
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a matter of fact, "all the rights of the States as independent
nations were surrendered to the United States .... Their
political status at home and abroad is that of States in the
United States."' 00 They do not exist as subjects of inter-
national law. They cannot enter into any relations with
foreign states or engage in war without the consent of
Congress. Thus, in the light of international law they are
not sovereign states any more; however, they like the
idea that they retained their sovereignty.o1
Even if it is admitted that the states are still "sove-
reign," 102 by entering the union they consented once and
for all to have their disputes settled by the Supreme Court
and not to take recourse to war in order to protect their
claims.'
Adjudicating controversies between states which were
once independent and still consider themselves "sovereign"
or "quasi-sovereign," the Supreme Court may assume
the role of a quasi-international tribunal."' But the scope
of the law it can apply is broad: it should base its de-
cisions on international as well as on municipal law.Os
Therefore, its rule of decision should not be, in all cases,
that "which controls foreign and independent states in
100. Chief Justice Waite in New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 74 (1883)
101. Actually, "sovereignty" means "supreme power," not subjected to any
limitations. But the creation of the Union imposed limitations on the power of
the States. Their "sovereignty," resting upon the powers not delegated to the
United States, may be compared to that of a county enjoying an autonomy as
to matters within its "domestic jurisdiction."
102. How difficult it is to make the theory of the sovereignty of the'States of
the Union understandable is well illustrated by the following words of Chief
Justice Waite in New Hampshire v. Louisiana, srupra note 100: "The States are
not nations, either as between themselves as towards foreign nations. They are
sovereign within their spheres, but their sovereignty stops short of nationality."
The concept of a sovereignty within some sphere does not exist in international
law, and the setting up of 'nationality" as a fuller "sovereignty" is puzzling.
103. In international law such a consent might have been given still before
the first World War by the device of "compulsory arbitration" treaties and was
extended by the system of the League of Nations and the United Nations (parti-
cularly, by the "optional clause," Art. 36 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice).
104. Cf. frupra, pp. 111-112.
105. "Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal,
we apply federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the
particular case may demand .... " Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-147
(1902). See also Connecticut v. Massachuetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
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their relations to each other," as was contended by the
State of Colorado in Kansas v. Colorado. °8
The jurisdiction over controversies between states, con-
ferred upon the Supreme Court is undoubtedly the most
important power of the federal judiciary. The Court has
been asked to resort to this jurisdiction in many instances,
and it has been pointed out that it settled some disputes
which if they had arisen between independent nations might
have resulted in wars.'0 7
The Supreme Court has dealt with various aspects of
interstate litigation, and the scope of decisional law in
that field is broad. The exercise of the Supreme Court's
original and exclusive jurisdiction in respect to contro-
versies between the states of the union seems to be a much
more interesting and practical problem than that in respect
to the other class of suits suable only in the Supreme Court:
those against public ministers. It has been dealt with in
some treatises and articles."'° The present short observa-
tions will only try to delimitate the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction and its most outstanding features.
It should be pointed out as a preliminary observation
that if a person responsible for the state sues or is sued on
behalf of the state the state itself is considered as plaintiff
or defendant, and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court attaches. Thus, in Kentucky v. Dennixon, Governor
and Executive Authority oJ the State oJ Ohio,1°9 it was said
that it had been settled that:
where the State is a party . . . the Governor represents the
State, and the suit may be, in form, a suit by him as Governor
106. 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902).
107. In cases of "a situation which, if it arose between independent sovereign-
ties, might lead to war," the Court's "jurisdiction and authority ...is not open
to doubt." Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906).
It must be realized, however, that in the disputes involving boundary questions
between independent countries, the determination of an international frontier
bears to the inhabitants of the disputed territories consequences much more
important than in the boundary litigation between the states of the union.
108. Among the general works dealing with that subject the most important
is that of JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CON-
TROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1919).
109. 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66, 98 (1860).
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in behalf of the State, where the State is plaintiff, and he must
be summoned or notified as the officer representing the State,
where the State is defendant. 110
In view of the fact that the Constitution did not impose
any restraint on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
respect to cases between states, it might seem that any
dispute, irrespective of its merits, could be brought in the
Supreme Court provided it was not political,' appropri-
ate for settlement by another branch of the government,
and that a real controversy existed.' However, this
power of the Court was contested in the early days of the
union. As in many other instances the powers of a federal
organ were interpreted narrowly by the states, and it took
some time before it was settled that such a construction
of the Constitution was inadmissible.
During the debates in the Constitutional Convention,
the Committee of Detail adopted on August 6th, 1787,
Art. XI, Sec. 3, which conferred upon the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over controversies between two or more states
except such "as shall regard territory or jurisdiction.'1 3
The final dropping of this restriction impliedly conferred
upon the Supreme Court the jurisdiction upon the ques-
tions relating to boundaries between the states. But some
states were not prone to recognize this power of the Court.
The leading authority for the Court's jurisdiction over
such controversies is the case of Rhode Island v. Mla'ra-
110. Cf. Chief Justice Marshall in The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo.
1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 110, 123-124 (1828): "In such a case, where the chief magistrate
of a State is sued, not by his name, but by his style of office, and the claim made
upon him is entirely in his official character, we think the State itself may be
considered as a party on the record. If the State is not a party, there is no party
against whom a decree can be made."
111. Controversies between states are "in their nature political, when the
sovereign or state reserves to itself the right of deciding on it." Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657, 737 (1838).
112. Otherwise, the Court will dismiss the action. "The proposed bill of
complaint does not present a justiciable controversy between two States. To
constitute such a controversy, it must appear that the complaining State has
suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for
judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State, which is suceptible
of judicial enforcement .... Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939).
113. A. T. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1941) 673.
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chu.rellr."' In 1832, the State of Rhode Island filed a bill
against the State of Massachusetts for the settlement of
the boundary between the two states. The exact border-
line had never been fixed and constituted a permanent cause
of disputes between the states for many years when they
were still colonies. While Rhode Island asserted its rights
to the territory in dispute, the jurisdiction over it was
exercised by Massachusetts.
The case reached its final phase in 1838, when it came
for the third time before the Supreme Court. Webster,
acting as counsel for Massachusetts, moved to dismiss the
bill on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction of the
cause: first, because of the character of the respondent,
independent of the nature of the suit; second, because of
the nature of the suit, independent of the character of
the respondent.
The Court did not have much difficulty in refuting the
first argument of the defendant state. It referred to the
Constitution by which "it was ordained" that the Court's
power should be exercised "in cases where a state was a
party ... as one of original jurisdiction. The states waived
their exemption from judicial power.""' ,
As to the second objection of Massachusetts, the Court
held that "though the Constitution [did] not, in terms,
extend the judicial power to all controversies between two
or more states, yet in terms exclude[d] none, whatever
may be their nature or subject."' " Moreover, the con-
114. 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657 (1838): a previous boundary dispute between
New lersey and New York, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 284 (1831) and 6 Pet. (31 U.S.)
323 (1832). did not result in any leading opinion of the Court.
In New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 1 (1799), Connecticut under-
took to make gr'ants of tracts of land belonging to New York, and a suit in equity,
asking for an injunction, was brought before the Supreme Court. The Court
said that it could, unquestionably, settle a boundary dispute between two States;
but the realparties in controversy, individuals claiming title to the land, brought
suits in the Circuit Court of Connecticut, ano the litigation in the Supreme Court
arose out of these suits; however, the defendants in the court below were not
parties to the case in the Supreme Court. The Court held that "as the State of
New York was not a party to the suits below, nor interested in the decision of
those suits, an injunction ought not to issue."
115. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657, 720 (1838).
116. Ibid.. 721.
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stitutional provisions were implemented by the Judiciary
Act of 1789.
"[Wihere no exception is made in terms," said the Court,
"none will be made by mere implication or construction;"117
and it expressed the opinion that "it would be a most
forced construction" to hold that the controversies which
relate to boundary "were excluded from judicial cognizance,
and that it was to be confined to controversies to arise
prospectively on other subjects." The Court corroborated
its reasoning by examining other provisions of the Con-
stitution, which limited the powers of the states in respect
to entering into treaties, agreements, and engaging in war.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice
Baldwin. In a dissent Chief Justice Taney said that a
controversy involving "sovereignty and jurisdiction" of
the state over a territory was political and should not be
decided by the Court.
Massachusetts, still unwilling to submit to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court in a boundary dispute, inter-
preted the Court's decree as upholding its jurisdiction be-
cause of the appearance of the defendant state. This in-
terpretation was expressly rejected by the Court ;_n the
next case of Rhode Lsland v. Mfaxsachuxelix."' The Court
held that if the defendant state refused to appear the
plaintiff would be allowed to proceed ex parle."
Since the case of Rhode 1cland v. Maxsachuxelixr, the
Supreme Court has decided a large number of boundary
disputes between the states. This kind of litigation between
states appeared to be most frequent.
It is true that still after Rhode 1€land v. Maexachusetix
attempts were made to challenge the Court's jurisdiction.
Thus, in Virginia v. Wert Virginia'" it was argued that
the Court had no power to settle the boundary between
the two states, because the dispute involved the considera-
117. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657, 722 (1838).
118. 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 755 (1838).
119. Justice Baldwin dissented without giving reasons for his dissent.
120. 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 39 (1871).
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tion of questions purely political.' But, in spite of the
fact that the background of the case was political indeed-
the Civil War, the birth of a new state, and popular vote
in two counties-the Court applied its "established doc-
trine" and assumed jurisdiction.
A peculiarity of controversies involving boundary lines
between the states is the rule established by the Court in
Florida v. Georgia"2 that the United States will be per-
mitted to produce evidence, unconnected with the argu-
ments of the litigating states, without becoming a party
to the suit in the technical sense of the term. Both states
resisted such intervention of the United States. But the
Court recognized that the union had a "deep interest in
the decision of this controversy" ' and had no means of
review if it were decided adversely to its rights. The
United States represented "twenty-nine other States, who
[were] also interested in the adjustment of this boundary."
Therefore, justice required "that they should be heard
before their rights [were] concluded by the judgment of
the Court," and the Attorney General of the United States
was permitted to intervene and file the testimony referred
to in his information. 2 4
That the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended to
any other possible justiciable dispute between the states
was much easier to settle than in respect to the most
delicate question of boundaries. That it can construe
compacts between the states has been held in many in-
stances, e.g. in the mentioned cases of Rhode Lrlandv. Maxxa-
chusetts" 5 and Virginia v. Wed Virginia.2 1 It has the
power, too, to pass upon cases brought by a state as parenr
121. In Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 478 (1854), the Court expressed
the opinion that "a question of boundary between States is necessarily a political
question .... But under our form of government a boundary between two States
may become a judicial question to be decided by this court."
122. 17 How. (58 U.S.) 478 (1854).
123. Ibid., 493.
124. Four justices dissented.
125. 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657 (1838).
126. 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 39, 55 (1871). The Court held it had the competence
to determine how the public debt of the two states should be apportioned.
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patriae protecting the interests of its inhabitants.' 27  And
it may be said that the general rule has been clearly es-
tablished
that whenever and in all cases where one state may choose to
make complaint against another, no matter whether the subject
of complaint arises from the legislation of the defendant state,
or from acts of its officers and agents, and no matter whether
the nature of the injury complained of is to affect the property
rights or the sovereign powers of the complaining state, or to
affect the rights of its citizens, the jurisdiction of this court
would attach.""8
In spite of this rule, in a case involving a "novel char-
acter" of the problems presented, the Court may examine
the question of whether it is within its jurisdiction although
this jurisdiction is not contested by the parties. Thus, in
Texas" v. Florida"2 ' the Court inquired, on its own motion,
whether it had jurisdiction of a suit in the nature of inter-
pleader brought in order to determine the true domicile
of a decedent and the right to levy taxes. The Court
assumed equity jurisdiction of the case.
The Supreme Court developed some special rules In
respect to the exercise of its jurisdiction in disputes be-
tween states.
Thus, the Court will not assume jurisdiction of a case
involving matters of slight importance. The Constitution
did. not fix any jurisdictional amount in cases within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
the Court itself imposed a limitation, applicable parti-
cularly to cases in equity. In New York v. New Jersey 1
30
the Court said:
Before this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary
power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State
at the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights must
be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.
127. See the fourth part of this article, pages 145-152, infra.
128. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 239 (1901).
129. 306 U.S. 398, 405 (1939).
130. 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1906).
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This requirement has been reaffirmed in other cases.3
and is now well settled.
Not only the wrong suffered by the complainant state
must be serious, but the evidence presented by it in sup-
port of its claim must be clear and cannot present any
serious doubts. In North Dakota v. Minnesota"' the Court
said:
In such action by one State against another, the burden on the
complainant State of sustaining the allegations of its complaint
is much greater than that imposed upon a complainant in an
ordinary suit between private parties."'
The Court established still some other features of inter-
state litigation; thus, in cases of such a magnitude, the
Court will decline to apply the general rule that "the
truth of material and relevant matters, set forth with
requisite precision, are admitted by demurrer." ' 4  The
joinder of parties will not be permitted if not strictly
necessary;". and the Court will consider the cases "in
the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a quasi-
international controversy."138
The question of the execution of the Supreme Court's
decrees is separate from the problem of its jurisdiction.
Suffice it to say here, that the defiance of some states to
131. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906); Connecticut v. Massa-
chusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522
(1936). In Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934), the Court said that its
"jurisdiction in respect of controversies between States will not be exerted, in
the absence of absolute necessity."*
132. 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1925).
133. See also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1945); rehearing denied,
321 U.S. 803 (1944), where the Court said: "In such disputes as this, the court
is conscious of the reat and serious caution with which it is necessary to ap-
proach the inquiry wtether a case is proved. Not every matter which would war-
rant resort to equity by one citizen against another would justify our interference
with the action of a State."
134. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902).
135. "Considerations of convenience that in suits between private parties
reasonably may justify exercise of discretion in support of such joinders have no
bearing in a case such as this." Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).
136. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911); ci. New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-343 (1931), (bill in equity to enjoin defendant from
diverting water from the Delaware River): "We are met at the outset by the
question what rule is to be applied. It is established that a more liberal answer
may be given in a controversy between neighbor members of a single State ....
[T]he efort a'ways is to secure an equitable apportionment without squibbling
over formulas."
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comply with its decisions in the early days of the union' 7
does not seem to be possible today. Anyhow, if the Court
had jurisdiction of a controversy, it assumed its duties
and proceeded to deliver a judgment irrespective of the
position which the states could have taken in respect to
the execution of the decree.
The case of Kentucky v. Dennixron3 8 was a noteworthy
exception. A dispute between Kentucky and Ohio, acting
by its governor, involved the extradition of Lago, "a
free man of color," who enticed a slave "'to leave her owner
and possessor, and did aid and assist said slave in an at-
tempt to make her escape . . . against the peace and dig-
nity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky."' 3 °  Accord-
ing to Kentucky law Lago committed a crime. The Gover-
nor of Ohio refused the request that he extradite Lago
as a fugitive from justice. Kentucky asked the Supreme
Court to issue a mandamus. The Court assumed jurisdic-
tion of the case, recognized its justiciable character, and
held that defendant had the duty to comply with the
request of Kentucky. However, since he refused to dis-
charge this duty, and since there was "no power delegated
to the General Government, either through the Judicial
Department or any other department, to use any coercive
means to compel him," the motion for mandamus was
overruled.
The specific circumstances of the case may make us ap-
plaud the Court's refusal to issue the mandamus; but it is
difficult to agree with the reasoning of the Court. From the
time of the Civil War no other case identical to Kentucky
v. Dennison can arise; but it is conceivable that a state will
decline to extradite a criminal guilty of some other crime.
In such a case, it seems that the Court should not make
its decision dependent on speculations whether the defen-
dant state will comply with it or not. If an interstate
dispute is political, the Court cannot intervene; but once
137. The case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 (1793), was a strik-
ing example; see infra note 148.
138. 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1860).
139. Ibid., 67.
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it has decided that the controversy is justiciable, its duty
is to declare how the wrong committed should be redressed.
The legislative branch of the government should be
concerned with the question of how to assure the execution
of the Court's decisions.' But, in absence of any legisla-
tion, the Court itself may provide for some means of
execution in some cases.
The famous litigation between Virginia and West Vir-
ginia, which reached the Supreme Court nine times,"'
presented in the case of 19184 the question of execution.
Virginia applied to the Court for a mandamus to compel
the levy of a tax to satisfy the judgment. This time the
Court did not think such an action transgressed its powers.
It expressly upheld its power to provide for the execution
of its decrees; but, showing an extraordinary patience, it
still postponed the exercise of this power and gave the
defendant state another possibility to take the necessary
steps to comply with the judgment. At last, in 1919,
West Virginia's legislature provided for the payment of
the debt due to Virginia.
Although not expressly overruled, Kentucky v. Dennison
is no more a guide for the Supreme Court's decisions.
4. Suits by or on behal oJ Individualr against the States
Besides Art. III there is still another provision of the
United States Constitution dealing with the federal judi-
ciary. It is the XIth Amendment, limiting the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction. The Amendment, adopted in 1798
declares that:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.
140. However, after the non-compliance of Georgia with one of the Supreme
Court's judgments, President Andrew Jackson "is reported to have stamped his
foot, sayin 'John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.' JAMES
BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BE-
TWEEN STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1919) 529.
141. For details of this dispute, see JAMES BROWN SCOTT, op. cit., 519-
534.
142. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
146 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
Today, with the XIth Amendment and Sec. 1251 of
Title 28, U.S.C.A., there cannot be any doubt that suits
between states and citizens of other states are not within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Suits where states are plaintiffs are within its
original and concurrent jurisdiction, and those where
states are defendants are not subject to federal jurisdiction
at all. These principles, however, could not be deducted
from the very text of Art. III of the Constitution which
was the only provision to be applied in the earliest days
of the United States. And, as a matter of fact, the XIth
Amendment repeals in part Art. III, Sec. 2, of the Con-
stitution. While, according to paragraph (2), Sec. 2, the
Supreme Court was to have the original jurisdiction in all
cases "in which a State shall be a party," paragraph (1)
extended the federal judicial power to controversies "be-
tween a State and citizens of another State."
The provisions of Art. III are clear"' and it seems that
they must be understood as covering cases where states
are either plaintiffs or defendants in suits in which indi-
viduals are the other party to the litigation. This con-
struction of the constitutional provisions was embodied in
Sec. 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,'" which took them
just as they were written"' and did not bar citizens of one
state from suing other states before the federal courts.
However, it did not subm;t such suits to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
145. "Unmistakable terms." ROBERT II. JACKSON, TIIE STRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. (1941) 13.
144. See supra, page 114.
145. However, Hamilton understood them as subjected to the general principle
of the sovereignty of states and wrote: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty,
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its conrent .... The con-
tracts between a nation and individuals, are only binding on the conscience of the
sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive. force. They confer no right
of action, independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to
authorize suits against states for the debts they owe? How would recoveries be
enforced? It is evident that it could not be done, without waging war against
the contracting state; and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication,
and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the state governments, a power which
would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrant-
able." THE FEDERALIST, No. 81,p. 417 (edited by Max Beloff 1948).
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The provision of the Constitution construed as granting
to the citizen of one state the right to sue another state in
the federal courts was considered by some founders as
" wise," "honest," and "useful ;16 but "many of the
leading members of the convention [argued], with great
force, against it."' After the Supreme Court proceeded
to render judgments in suits brought by individuals against
states, a wide feeling of disapproval on the part of the
several states brought about the enactment of the XIth
Amendment. '4
Thus, the problem of suing the states by citizens of
other states before the federal courts has been settled early
by a constitutional enactment. However, the Xlth Amend-
ment did not mention anything about the suing of states
by their own citizens before the United States tribunals.
It seems that the judicial power of the union was not
intended to extend to such cases, since it was understood
that the several states retained their "quasi-sovereignty,"
and with it-the power over their citizens. But after a
hundred years of the union elapsed and no express con-
stitutional provision prohibited such a suit, a case was
brought in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana by one Hans against his own state.
The Circuit Court dismissed the case, and the Supreme
Court in affirming 49 based its opinion on the rationale of
the Xlth Amendment, the pronouncements of some
founders like Hamilton, Madison and Marshall, and the
spirit of the Constitution. The Court said that plaintiff
attempted "to strain the Constitution and the law to a
construction never imagined or dreamed of,"' 10 and held
146. Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419, 479
(1793). Plaintiff was a citizen of South Carolina.
147. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
148. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the first case of that sort, Chis-
holm -.. Georgia (supra note 146), was not complied with by Georgia, which
"passed a statute making it a felony for any person to execute the process of the
Court under a penalty of 'death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged'."
ROBERT H. JACKS ON, op. cit.. 14.
149. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
150 Ibid., at 15.
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that the consent of the state to be sued by its own citi-
zens was necessary. 6 '
If a state cannot be sued by an individual, can it be-
come a defendant in a case where another state sues on
behalf of its citizen?
The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is based on the quality of the parties, not on the
subject-matter of the controversy.'62  The Constitution
and the judiciary acts laid down the principle that suits
in which both parties are states may be brought only in
the Supreme Court. However, some limitations on this
general principle have been established by the judicial
decisions of the Court. Thus, as a broad proposition,
the Court held in Louisiana v. Texax' 13 that the contro-
versy to be determined by it must be one "arising directly"
between the two states, "and not a controversy in the vindi-
cation of grievances of particular individuals." There
must be "a direct issue" between the states;"4 and in
order that such a controvers.y can be recognized as ex-
isting, "something more must be put forward than that
the citizens of one state are injured by the maladminis-
tration of the laws of another."'' 5  In an earlier case156
it was held that a state had no interest and could not
become a party to litigation where an ejectment suit
was brought by an individual against another, in spite
of the fact that the case involved the question of the
boundary between the two states.
The first famous case which settled the principle that,
in order to have the standing to sue, the plaintiff state
151. "llt has been long since settled that the whole sum of the judicial power
granted by the Constitution to the United States does not embrace the authority
to entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State without its consent,
and this rule covers also the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. since
the second clause of Art. Ill, Sec. 2, of the Constitution merely distributes the
federal jurisdiction conferred by the preceeding one into original and a ellate
jurisdiction and does not itself confer any. Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 .U. .11,
313-314 (1920).
152. "The original jurisdiction depends solely on the character of the parties."




'156. New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 1 (1799); see note 114.
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must be a real party in interest was New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, decided together with New York v. Louisiana
in 1883.111 The controversy involved enforcement of the
defendant state's contractural obligation which had been
assigned by an individual to the plaintiff state only for
the purpose of bringing the suit. The rights of the assignor
to recovery were reserved.' 8
The Court examined the history of the XIth Amend-
ment and held that its purpose was to deny any remedy
to the individuals before the federal courts in actions
against the states. The plaintiff states could not maintain
the suit, since it was "beyond all doubt . . . commenced
and ... prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and
coupons." Suits brought directly by the individuals were
permitted by the Constitution, and there was no reason
to believe that "it wa§ the intention of the framers of the
Constitution" ' to grant a parallel right to the state to
sue on behalf of its citizens. Thus, when the XIth Amend-
ment took away the remedy granted by the Constitution,
no other was left, and "one State cannot create a contro-
versy with another State . . . by assuming the prosecution
of debts owing by the other State to its citizens."' 0
The decision in New Hampshire v. Louisiana saved to
the Court a great number of potential cases involving
similar causes of action.
The rationalization of the Court did not cover cases
where the plaintiff state becomes an absolute owner of the
167. 108 U.S. 74 (1883).
158. On July 18. 1879, an act was passed-in New Hampshire by virtue of which
the citizens of the state, owners "of any claim against any of the United States
* . . arising upon a written obligation to pay money issued by such State ... may
assign the same to the State of New Hampshire." Upon the assignment the
attorney general was to prosecute an action [or the recovery of the money due,
to "keep all moneys collected upon such claim • . . separate and apart from any
other moneys of this State . . . and pay to the assignor. of such claim all such
sums of money as may be recovered by him . .." Substantially, the same act was
passed by the legislature of New York on May 15, 1880.
159. Note 157 rupra, 91.
160. It is interesting to recall that before 1948, in the federal practice, the
execution of an assignment had no effect upon the jurisdiction of the courts for
the citizenship of the first assignor remained controlling. However, this principle
had no bearing upon New Hampshire v. Louisiana.
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bonds of another state and is maintaining a suit on its
own behalf; but in South Dakota v. North Carolina"" it
was held (four Justices dissenting) that the Court had
jurisdiction of a case brought by the plaintiff state against
the defendant. Here the plaintiff owned shares of stock and
coupons issued by the defendant state which were unpaid
for thirty years. The motives of the individual in making
a gift of the bonds to the plaintiff were held to be irrelevant.
The construction of the Constitution made by the Court
in respect to contractual claims was upheld also in respect
to money damages in tort actions. In North Dakota v.
1 llinnerota"'6 one of the counts of action was for money
compensation to North Dakota farmers for damages a-
mounting to more than a million dollars. The damage
caused by overflows of the Bois de Sioux River was at-
tributed by plaintiff to the construction and operation of
ditches by defendant. The Court invoked the Xlth Amend-
ment, cited Ne,, Ham pshire v. Louixiana, and denied its
jurisdiction to pass upon the claim. In Y4faxrachuretts v.
/lijrrouri"3 the Court made a general statement that the
plaintiff state "may not invoke our jurisdiction for the
benefit of individuals."
The above mentioned holdings of the Supreme Court
do not preclude the states from bringing suits against
other states in the exercise of their duty to protect their
citizens from an imminent danger. A significant case, up-
holding the right of the state to sue as parensr patriae "to
protect the general comfort, health, or property rights of
its inhabitants threatened by the proposed or continued
action" of another state, is North Dakota v. MJinnerota.""
The case involved the changing of the "method of draining
water from lands within its border" by Minnesota."'
The decision was based upon some previous holdings of
the Court sustaining its jurisdiction in interstate litigation
161. 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
162. 263 U.S. 365 (1923).
163. 308 U.S. 1, 17 (1939).
164. 263 U.S. 365 (1904).
165. Ibid., 374.
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in actions: to enjoin the deposit by another state, in an
interstate stream, of drainage containing noxious typhoid
germs because dangerous to the health of the inhabitants
of the plaintiff state; 6 to restrain one state from a diver-
sion of water from an interstate stream by which the
lands of a state lower down on the'stream may be deprived
of the use of its water for irrigation in alleged violation of
the right of the lower state; 7 to prevent a state from
diverting water from an interstate stream to the injury of
rights acquired through prior appropriations of the water
by land owners of another state under the doctrine of
appropriation recognized and administered in both states;"'
or to enjoin a state from enforcing its statute by which
the flow of natural gas in interstate commerce from this
state was forbidden, to the threatened loss and suffering
of the people of the suing state who had become dependent
for comfort and health upon its use.' 9 States have the same
right to bring suits as parens patriae acting on behalf of
themselves in order to protect their citizens in instances
in which the defendant party is not a state.'
In the light of these holdings, a general principle may
be laid down that the states, as parenr patriae, have the
right "to protect [their] citizens in relation to quasi-sove-
reign interests," but have no standing "to represent their
individual rights for the purpose of enforcing their contract,
tort, or statutory claims.''7
This principle developed by the Supreme Court is con-
trary to the practice in international law, although in
many respects interstate controversies are comparable to
international ones. In the traditional law of nations, indi-
viduals are not subjects of international law and may
not sue foreign states as long as their government does
166. -Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.208, 241 (1901, and 200 U.S. 396, 518(1905).
167. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141, 143 (1902).
168. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922).
169. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
170. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
171. J.W. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JU-
DICIAL CODE, (1949) 624-625.
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not uphold their claim. But each cause of an individual
may be supported by his goverment and thus acquire the
character of an international dispute, cognizable by inter-
national courts. A number of cases have been decided in
accordance with this principle.'2
The power of the independent states to espouse the
claims of their citizens, incident to national sovereignty,
"involves also the national powers of levying war;" whereas,
the states of the United States "can neither make war nor
peace without the consent of the national government." '
5. Conftoerriejs between foreign States and Sales J o the
Union
The Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all controversies between two or more states; but
how is the word state to be understood? Does it cover
foreign states, or does it relate only to the states of the
union?
All the powers not delegated to the union are reserved
for the states; the federal government is not competent to
interfere in matters which are within the jurisdiction of
the states. On the other hand, the states surrendered to
the union the whole area of their foreign relations. They
do not possess any personality in the law of nations. As
they are not subjects of international law, they do not
entertain any diplomatic relations with foreign states; and,
in case of an action of a state impairing the interests of a
foreign state, the latter may not seek redress by a direct
dealing with the state of the union. It is not able to settle
the litigation by the usual means applied in international
disputes, such as diplomatic negotiations or arbitration.
All it can do is to apply to the federal government.
In any case where an international treaty was concluded,
the federal jurisdiction increases and the state jurisdiction
172. E.g., the Mavrommatis cases, decided by the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice, where the Greek Government maintained suits against the
British Government on behalf of its citizen.
173. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 104 U.S. 74, 90 (1883).
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
must give way by virtue of the supremecy clause of the
Constitution.' 74 Thus, in the affair of the schools in San
Francisco, where the State of California excluded Japanese
children from the public schools of that city, contrary to
a treaty of 1894 between the United States and Japan, 17 1
the Japanese government had a legal basis, by virtue of
the American legal system itself, to ask the federal govern-
ment for intervention. Similarly, in the cases of the lynch-
ing of Italians 7" the Italian government did not institute
any direct actions against the states which might have been
held responsible for the mob violence, but intervened before
the federal government and invoked the provisions of a
treaty granting Italian citizens "the most constant pro-
tection and security for their persons and property."' 17
But it is more difficult for a foreign state to seek redress
from an unwilling state of the union if no treaty between
the foreign state and the United States was concluded and
the matter is not within the federal jurisdiction.
It might have seemed that the Constitution did not bar
foreign states from suing a state of the union in the Sup-
reme Court. In the early days of the nation, in more than
one dictum, the justices of the United States highest tri-
bunal expressed the opinion that such a suit was possible
without the consent of the defendant state.1 78
For many years the Supreme Court was not asked to
voice an opinion on the problem. It seemed that it would
have to decide the question in 1916, when the Republic
of Cuba asked leave of the Court to file a declaration against
the State of North Carolina.' 70 However, the motion was
withdrawn before any further proceedings were taken.
174. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
175. 3 HACKWORTH'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1942)
755-757.
176. 6 MOORE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906) 337-849.
177. Ibid., 838.
178. J. J. Lenoir, Suit by a Foreign Stale againxl a Stale oJ the Union, 7 MISS.
L.JOUR. 134, note 3 (1934).
179. Cuba v. North Carolina, 242 U.S. 665 (1917); see JAMES BROWN
SCOTT, op. cit., 42.
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The first and only case which caused the. Court to ex-
amine the question was Monaco v. Jiismippi in 1934."'
In 1933 the Principality of Monaco received as an ab-
solute gift some unpaid bonds and coupons issued by the
state of Mississippi in the first half of the nineteenth
century. The gift was to be used by the Principality
"to the causes of any of its charities, to the furtherance of
its internal development or to the benefit of its citizens in
such manner as it may select."
Monaco applied to the Supreme Court for leave to bring
an action against Mississippi to recover the principal and
interest of the bonds, and asserted that plaintiff was a
foreign state within the meaning of Art. II, Sec. 2, of the
Constitution and that all the requisites for bringing a suit
in the Supreme Court were met.
Mississippi, in its return to the rule to show cause why
leave should not be granted, raised six objections; but the
Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes,
found it necessary to deal with only one of them: that
which stressed the lack of consent of the State of Mississippi
to be sued.
The absence of an express constitutional requirement of
consent of a state to be sued was held by the Court to be
inconclusive; nothing was said in the Constitution about
the necessity of procuring consent of the United States
before any action might be brought against it; however,
its consent was required in accordance with the principle
of the immunity of the sovereign from suit. The Xith
Amendment did not exhaust the restrictions upon suits
against states; they retained their sovereignty, and their
consent to be sued was necessary, save where there had
been "a surrender of [their] immunity in the plan of the
convention."
In respect to controversies between each other, the
states waived their exemption from judicial power in Art.
III, Sec. 2, of the Constitution, since such waiver was
180. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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"essential to the peace of the Union." In the Constitu-
tional Convention there were no discussions relating to
suits between the states of the union and foreign states;
but in pronouncements posterior to the Convention, Madi-
son, Marshall and Hamilton clearly expressed the opinion
that the waiver did not cover suits brought by foreign
states, and that in cases other than those between one
state of the union and another, or between a state and the
union, the full principle of immunity was unimpaired and
the consent was necessary. The enactment of the XIth
Amendment reinforced this principle. Thus, the waiver
of consent did not run in favor of a foreign state; and "the
foreign State enjoys a similar sovereign immunity and
without her consent may not be sued by a State of the
Union."
Thus, the possibility of a suit against a state of the
union by a foreign state was denied by the Court. A new
constitutional principle was settled.
